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Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies


  • Chongwoo Choe
  • In-Uck Park


In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. We study when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains the authority, which fails to motivate the manager to acquire valuable information, leading to suboptimal decisions and inefficient incentive provision to the worker. Beneficial delegation should necessarily motivate the manager to acquire information, which is possible only when the authority is delegated to the manager. We also document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Chongwoo Choe & In-Uck Park, 2008. "Information Gathering, Delegated Contracting And Corporate Hierarchies," Monash Economics Working Papers 19/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-19

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Corporate hierarchies; information gathering; delegation; centralization.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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