Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation
In settings where the Revelation Principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision-making, and at best achieve the same level of performance.This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract.
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|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston University, Industry Studies Program; Department of Economics, 270 Bay Road, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.|
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/isp/
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