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Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective

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  • Luis Garicano
  • Richard A. Posner

Abstract

Two recent failures of the U.S. intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), or 9/11 Commission.The mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005), or the WMD Commission. In this paper, we use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues these commissions have raised in the ongoing discussion about how to prevent intelligence failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Garicano & Richard A. Posner, 2005. "Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 151-170, Fall.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:19:y:2005:i:4:p:151-170 Note: DOI: 10.1257/089533005775196723
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    Cited by:

    1. Aidan R. Vining, 2016. "What Is Public Agency Strategic Analysis (PASA) and How Does It Differ from Public Policy Analysis and Firm Strategy Analysis?," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-31, December.
    2. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2006. "Bank runs and investment decisions revisited," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 217-232.
    3. Michel-Kerjan Erwann & de Marcellis-Warin Nathalie, 2006. "Public-Private Programs for Covering Extreme Events: The Impact of Information Distribution on Risk-Sharing," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-30, February.
    4. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 137-192.
    5. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2016. "Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 112-135.
    6. repec:eee:pubeco:v:152:y:2017:i:c:p:143-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 137-192.
    8. Richard A. Posner, 2006. "A Review of Steven Shavell's Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 405-414.
    9. Neilson, William S. & Winter, Harold, 2008. "Votes based on protracted deliberations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 308-321, July.
    10. Herrera, Helios & Reuben, Ernesto & Ting, Michael M., 2017. "Turf wars," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 143-153.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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