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Military Aid, Direct Intervention and Counterterrorism

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Garcia-Alonso

    (University of Kent)

  • Paul Levine

    (University of Surrey)

  • Ron Smith

    (Birkbeck College, University of London)

Abstract

We present a model of transnational terrorism where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself or in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself. We use backward induction to solve a multiple stage game where the home country first commits to its policy decisions, then the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducing terrorist capability and finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the home or foreign country. In a numerical solution of the calibrated model, direct intervention only arises in equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not close substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A higher relative military efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Ron Smith, 2015. "Military Aid, Direct Intervention and Counterterrorism," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0115, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  • Handle: RePEc:sur:surrec:0115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Sandler, Todd, 2021. "Counterterrorism policy: Spillovers, regime solidity, and corner solutions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 811-827.
    2. Topham, Eva & McMillan, David & Bradley, Stuart & Hart, Edward, 2019. "Recycling offshore wind farms at decommissioning stage," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 698-709.
    3. Sushil Gupta & Martin K. Starr & Reza Zanjirani Farahani & Mahsa Mahboob Ghodsi, 2020. "Prevention of Terrorism–An Assessment of Prior POM Work and Future Potentials," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1789-1815, July.
    4. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2022. "Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency," Working Papers 2022-007, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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