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Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle

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  • Douglas W. Allen
  • Peter T. Leeson

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  • Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/684231
    DOI: 10.1086/684231
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leeson, Peter T., 2014. "Human Sacrifice," Review of Behavioral Economics, now publishers, vol. 1(1-2), pages 137-165, January.
    2. ., 2013. "The long wave," Chapters, in: Capitalism and Democracy, chapter 5, pages 93-113, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-841, August.
    4. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
    5. Frey, Bruno S & Buhofer, Heinz, 1988. "Prisoners and Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 19-46, April.
    6. Bruce M. S. Campbell, 2008. "Benchmarking medieval economic development: England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland, c.12901," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 61(4), pages 896-945, November.
    7. Douglas W. Allen & Clyde G. Reed, 2006. "The Duel of Honor: Screening For Unobservable Social Capital," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 8(1), pages 81-115.
    8. Peter T. Leeson, 2013. "Vermin Trials," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 811-836.
    9. Allen, Douglas W., 2002. "The British Navy Rules: Monitoring and Incompatible Incentives in the Age of Fighting Sail," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 204-231, April.
    10. Leeson, Peter T. & Nowrasteh, Alex, 2011. "Was privateering plunder efficient?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 303-317, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Maltsev, Vladimir, 2023. "The economics of military innovation under anarchy: The case of the Ukrainian Civil War of 1917–1921," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 180-190.
    2. Piano, Ennio E. & Rouanet, Louis, 2020. "Desertion as theft," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 169-183, April.
    3. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2016. "Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 112-135.
    4. Peter T Leeson & Ennio E Piano, 2021. "The golden age of mercenaries [Institutionally constrained technology adoption: Resolving the longbow puzzle]," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 25(3), pages 429-446.
    5. Fabio Padovano & Yvon Rocaboy, 2018. "How defense shapes the institutional organization of states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 111-134, April.
    6. Henry A. Thompson, 2024. "AI and the law," Papers 2412.05090, arXiv.org.
    7. Candela, Rosolino A., 2020. "The political economy of insecure property rights: insights from the Kingdom of Sicily," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 233-249, April.

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