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The golden age of mercenaries
[Institutionally constrained technology adoption: Resolving the longbow puzzle]

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  • Peter T Leeson
  • Ennio E Piano

Abstract

Between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries, Italian city-states abandoned citizen militaries for militaries composed of mercenaries: foreign soldiers for hire. So dramatic was the switch that this epoch has been called “the golden age of mercenaries,” and so treacherous did the mercenaries prove that Niccolò Machiavelli would later denounce them as “useless and dangerous.” Italian rulers knew of mercenaries’ infamous reputation when they hired them. To explain the puzzling fact that rulers hired mercenaries anyway, we develop a theory of military composition in which political circumstance constrains ruler choice. Comparative analysis of Venice and Florence provides evidence for our explanation.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter T Leeson & Ennio E Piano, 2021. "The golden age of mercenaries [Institutionally constrained technology adoption: Resolving the longbow puzzle]," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 25(3), pages 429-446.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ereveh:v:25:y:2021:i:3:p:429-446.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ereh/heaa020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Allen & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutionally Constrained Technology Adoption: Resolving the Longbow Puzzle," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    2. Brauer, Jurgen & van Tuyll, Hubert, 2008. "Castles, Battles, and Bombs," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226071633, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ennio E. Piano, 2024. "A theory of the city‐state: The rise and decline of the rule of law in Medieval Italy," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(1), pages 97-117, February.

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