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Civil War and Foreign Influence

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  • Facundo Albornoz
  • Esther Hauk

Abstract

We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely t oinduce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.

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  • Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2010. "Civil War and Foreign Influence," Working Papers 480, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:480
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    Cited by:

    1. Albornoz, Facundo & Hauk, Esther, 2014. "Civil war and U.S. foreign influence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 64-78.
    2. Magesan, Arvind & Swee, Eik Leong, 2018. "Out of the ashes, into the fire: The consequences of U.S. weapons sales for political violence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 133-156.
    3. Párraga Rodríguez, Susana, 2018. "The dynamic effects of public expenditure shocks in the United States," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 340-360.
    4. He, Xiaoyu & Mei, Yixin, 2024. "Can arms breed peace? The consequence of arms imports from the US on civil wars," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 207-229.
    5. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Abu-Bader, Suleiman & Ianchovichina, Elena, 2019. "Polarization, foreign military intervention, and civil conflict," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    7. Alastair Langtry & Niklas Potrafke & Marcel Schlepper & Timo Wochner, 2024. "Gambling for Re-election," CESifo Working Paper Series 11125, CESifo.
    8. Garcia-Alonso, Maria D.C. & Levine, Paul & Smith, Ron, 2016. "Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 112-135.
    9. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    10. Martínez, Luis R., 2017. "Transnational insurgents: Evidence from Colombia's FARC at the border with Chávez's Venezuela," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 138-153.
    11. World Bank, 2020. "Violence without Borders," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 33330.

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