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Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force

Author

Listed:
  • T. Clifton Morgan

    (Rice University)

  • Kenneth N. Bickers

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

Although the diversionary theory of international conflict is intuitively plausible and is supported by much anecdotal evidence, quantitative tests generally have failed to establish a systemic link between domestic political troubles and foreign policy adventurism. In this article we revise the diversionary theory. We argue that a state leader will treat an erosion of domestic support more seriously when it comes from within segments of society that are critical in the maintenance of the leader's ruling coalition than when it comes from other domestic groups. We also argue that diversionary behavior typically should involve actions short of war. The revised theory is tested for the United States over the period from 1953 to 1976. Multiple empirical techniques are used to analyze the relationship between the uses of external force by the United States and the level of support for the president among members of the president's party. The results provide strong support for the revised diversionary theory.

Suggested Citation

  • T. Clifton Morgan & Kenneth N. Bickers, 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(1), pages 25-52, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:36:y:1992:i:1:p:25-52
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002792036001002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mueller, John E., 1970. "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson1," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 18-34, March.
    2. Ostrom, Charles W. & Job, Brian L., 1986. "The President and the Political Use of Force," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 541-566, June.
    3. Ostrom, Charles W. & Simon, Dennis M., 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 334-358, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Albornoz, Facundo & Hauk, Esther, 2014. "Civil war and U.S. foreign influence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 64-78.
    2. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "A small victorious war: political institutions and international conflict," MPRA Paper 17041, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Nathan Jensen, 2007. "International institutions and market expectations: Stock price responses to the WTO ruling on the 2002 U.S. steel tariffs," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 261-280, September.
    4. Harrison, Mark, 2011. "Capitalism at War," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 60, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    5. Libman Alexander, 2010. "A Small Victorious War: Domestic Revolution and International Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, December.
    6. Randall J. Blimes, 2011. "International Conflict and Leadership Tenure," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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