Civil War and Foreign Influence
We study a symmetric information bargaining model of civil war where a third (foreign) party can affect the probabilities of winning the conflict and the size of the post conflict spoils. We show that the possible alliance with a third party makes peaceful agreements difficult to reach and might lead to new commitment problems that trigger war. Also, we argue that the foreign party is likely to induce persistent informational asymmetries which might explain long lasting civil wars. We explore both political and economic incentives for a third party to intervene. The explicit consideration of political incentives leads to two predictions that allow for identifying the influence of foreign intervention on civil war incidence. Both predictions are confirmed for the case of the U.S. as a potential intervening nation: (i) civil wars around the world are more likely under Republican governments and (ii) the probability of civil wars decreases with U.S. presidential approval rates.
|Date of creation:||28 Jun 2010|
|Date of revision:||19 Dec 2010|
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- Antràs, Pol & Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2011.
"Foreign influence and welfare,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 135-148, July.
- Antràs, Pol & Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2008. "Foreign Influence and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 6884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pol Antràs & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2008. "Foreign Influence and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 14129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Antras, Pol & Padro i Miquel, Gerard, 2009. "Foreign Influence and Welfare," Scholarly Articles 3374523, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan & Suresh Naidu, 2011. "Coups, Corporations, and Classified Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1375-1409.
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- Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró I Miquel, 2010. "Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1821-1858.
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- Markus Brückner & Antonio Ciccone, 2007. "International commodity prices, growth and the outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa," Economics Working Papers 1053, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 2009.
- Markus Brückner & Antonio Ciccone, 2009. "International Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers 2009-37, FEDEA.
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