Foreign Influence and Welfare
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- Antràs, Pol & Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2011. "Foreign influence and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 135-148, July.
- Antràs, Pol & Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2008. "Foreign Influence and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 6884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pol Antràs & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2008. "Foreign Influence and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 14129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Julia Cage & Lucie Gadenne, 2014.
"Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006,"
Sciences Po publications
info:hdl:2441/4icc4hr7684, Sciences Po.
- Cage, Julia & Gadenne, Lucie, 2016. "Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006," Economic Research Papers 269314, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Cag�, Julia & Gadenne, Lucie, 2017. "Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006," CEPR Discussion Papers 12469, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Cagé, Julia & Gadenne, Lucie, 2016. "Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 303, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Cage, Julia & Gadenne, Lucie, 2016. "Tax Revenues, Development, and the Fiscal Cost of Trade Liberalization, 1792-2006," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1132, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Albornoz, Facundo, 2011. "Political regimes and foreign intervention," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 192-201, March.
- Jan Fałkowski, 2018. "U.S. food aid and American exports to recipient countries during the Cold War," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 49(5), pages 659-668, September.
- Roberto Bonfatti, 2017.
"An economic theory of foreign interventions and regime change,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(1), pages 306-339, February.
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"Civil war and U.S. foreign influence,"
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- Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2010. "Civil War and Foreign Influence," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 836.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 19 Dec 2010.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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