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One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying

Author

Listed:
  • Aidt, T.S.
  • Hwang, U.

Abstract

This paper presents an argument in favor of foreign lobbying. We show how foreign lobbying can help internalize cross national externalities and promote social objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Aidt, T.S. & Hwang, U., 2008. "One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0860, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0860
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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0860.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Steven Husted, 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 89-99, Jan-Mar.
    4. Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1999. "Games Played Through Agents," Other publications TiSEM 3b5b6726-b55b-4959-80d5-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Michael J. Robbins, 2006. "Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 563-571, August.
    6. Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.
    7. Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Games Played Through Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 989-1026, July.
    8. Conconi, Paola, 2003. "Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 399-422, March.
    9. Gawande, Kishore & Maloney, William & Rojas, Gabriel V. Montes, 2007. "Can foreign lobbying enhance development ? The case of tourism in the Caribbean," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4275, The World Bank.
    10. Kee, Hiau Looi & Olarreaga, Marcelo & Silva, Peri, 2007. "Market access for sale," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 79-94, January.
    11. Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2008. "On the Internalization of Cross-National Externalities through Political Markets: The Case of Labour Standards," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 509-533, September.
    12. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-745, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Antràs, Pol & Padró i Miquel, Gerard, 2011. "Foreign influence and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 135-148, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign lobbying; common agency; campaign contributions; cross national externalities.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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