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Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Steven Husted

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

This paper uses general equilibrium modeling popularized by J. Bhagwati to explore the economic consequences of foreign financed lobbying in an open economy. It is shown that, unlike domestic lobbying, foreign lobbying need not be directly unproductive, at least in the country where the lobbying occurs. Under plausible conditions, foreign lobbying may even raise domestic welfare relative to free trade with no lobbying. Also included in the paper are some data on the level and types of foreign lobbying in the United States in 1984. Contrary to popular belief, these expenditures appear to be quite small relative to other trade flows and potential benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven Husted, 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 89-99, Jan-Mar.
  • Handle: RePEc:eej:eeconj:v:17:y:1991:i:1:p:89-99
    as

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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/eej/Archive/Volume17/V17N1P89_99.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-1087, December.
    2. Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Richard A. Brecher & Tatsuo Hatta, 1985. "The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Exogenous (policy-Imposed) and Endogenous (Transfer-Induced) Distortion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(3), pages 697-714.
    3. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-745, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gawande, Kishore & Maloney, William & Montes-Rojas, Gabriel, 2009. "Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism: Evidence from the Caribbean," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 267-275, November.
    2. repec:pit:wpaper:222 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Toke Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014. "To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross National Externalities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1402, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Montes-Rojas, Gabriel V., 2013. "Can Poor Countries Lobby for More US Bilateral Aid?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 77-87.
    5. Aidt, T.S. & Hwang, U., 2008. "One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0860, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibrium; Free Trade; Lobbying; Trade; Welfare;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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