Protection versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00135.x
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- Devashish Mitra & Dimitrios D. Thomakos & Mehmet A. Ulubaşoĝlu, 2016. "Protection Versus Promotion: An Empirical Investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 12, pages 221-236, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas R., 2014.
"Political support for trade policy in the European Union,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 243-253.
- Francois, Joseph, 2014. "Political support for trade policy in the European Union," Papers 889, World Trade Institute.
- Francois, Joseph & Nelson, Douglas & Pelkmans-Balaoing, Annette, 2008.
"Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: Estimating Political Weights in the EU,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Joseph Francis Francois & Douglas Nelson & Annette Pelkmans-Balaoing, 2008. "Endogenous Protection in General Equilibrium: estimating political weights in the EU," Economics working papers 2008-15, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
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JEL classification:
- F0 - International Economics - - General
- F6 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization
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