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Trade Liberalization and Industrial Concentration:Evidence from Brazil

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  • Giovanni Facchini; Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira

Abstract

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988-1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced,more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline speci.cation, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Facchini; Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira, 2004. "Trade Liberalization and Industrial Concentration:Evidence from Brazil," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 126, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:126
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    3. Eric ROUGIER & François COMBARNOUS & Yves-André FAURE, 2017. "The ‘local economy’ effect of social transfers: A municipality-level analysis of the local growth impact of the Bolsa Familia Programme in the Brazilian Nordeste," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2017-09, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    4. Baybars Karacaovali, 2011. "Productivity Matters For Trade Policy: Theory And Evidence," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(1), pages 33-62, February.
    5. Rougier, Eric & Combarnous, François & Fauré, Yves-André, 2018. "The “Local Economy” Effect of Social Transfers: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Bolsa Família Program on Local Productive Structure and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 199-215.
    6. Atindra Dahal, 2020. "Re-defining Modernity and Development Dimension in Quest of Indigenous and Ingenuous Prosperity of Himalayan Region," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 3(1), pages 11-25, February.
    7. Hirata, Guilherme & Soares, Rodrigo R., 2016. "Competition and the Racial Wage Gap: Testing Becker's Model of Employer Discrimination," IZA Discussion Papers 9764, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Jørn Rattsø & Torfinn Harding, 2009. "Industrial labor productivities and tariffs in South Africa: Identification based on multilateral liberalization reform," Working Paper Series 10309, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    9. Wang, Chao & Zhang, Xinyi & Vilela, André L.M. & Liu, Chao & Stanley, H. Eugene, 2019. "Industrial structure upgrading and the impact of the capital market from 1998 to 2015: A spatial econometric analysis in Chinese regions," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 513(C), pages 189-201.
    10. Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão, 2004. "On the use (fulness) of CGE modelling in trade negotiations and policy," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 564, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    11. repec:thr:techub:1003:y:2020:i:1:p:11-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Villalobos Barría, Carlos & Klasen, Stephan, 2016. "The impact of SENAI's vocational training program on employment, wages, and mobility in Brazil: Lessons for Sub Saharan Africa?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 74-96.
    13. Armando Castelar Pinheiro & Regis Bonelli, 2007. "Comparative Advantage or Economic Policy? Stylized Facts and Reflections on Brazil´s Insertion in the World Economy - 1994 - 2005," Discussion Papers 1275, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    14. Torfinn Harding & Jørn Rattsø, 2010. "Industrial labour productivities and tariffs in South Africa," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(3), pages 459-485, July.
    15. Lazzarini, Sérgio G., 2012. "Strategizing by the Government: Industrial Policy and Sustainable Competitive Advantage," Insper Working Papers wpe_289, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    16. Yu, Zhuangxiong & Cheng, Jiajia & Mukhopadhaya, Pundarik & Dong, Jiemiao, 2023. "Do information spillovers across products aggravate product market monopoly? An examination with Chinese data," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    lobby formation; tariffs;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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