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Election campaign finance bans and corruption: effectiveness across parliamentary and presidential democracies

Author

Listed:
  • Rajeev K. Goel

    (Illinois State University
    Institute for Studies on the Mediterranean (ISMed)/National Research Council (CNR)
    Kiel Institute for the World Economy)

  • Michael A. Nelson

    (University of Akron)

Abstract

Using data on a large sample of nations, this research studies the effects of campaign finance reforms on corruption, including bans on contributions by trade unions and corporations. The focus on campaign finance bans in presidential versus parliamentary democracies is a unique aspect. We find that, while bans on campaign donations to political parties and candidates by trade unions are effective in reducing corruption, their efficacy varies across presidential and parliamentary democracies. Specifically, bans on campaign contributions to political candidates and parties reduce corruption in presidential democracies, but they are ineffective in parliamentary democracies. Campaign contribution bans on corporations are largely ineffective. When a broader measure of institutional quality/enforcement is considered, its effectiveness dominates the effects of individual bans. Some of these findings are unique and suggest that policymakers considering combating corruption should take into account the form of democracy, the type of campaign finance ban, and the nation’s overall institutional quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2025. "Election campaign finance bans and corruption: effectiveness across parliamentary and presidential democracies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 129-156, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:36:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10602-024-09447-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-024-09447-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Elections; Campaign contributions; Unions; Political parties; Government; Presidential democracy; Parliamentary democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K16 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Election Law

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