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Corruption And Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross‐Section Of Countries*

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  • STEFAN KRAUSE
  • FABIO MÉNDEZ

Abstract

In this paper, we study whether voters are more likely to “vote out” a corrupt incumbent than to re‐elect him. Specifically, we examine whether they retract their support from political candidates who they think are corrupt by looking at changes in an index of corruption perceptions between the current and the last elections. Our results suggest that corruption in public office is effectively punished by voters. Furthermore, our findings support the idea that both the political system and the democratic experience are important determinants of the voters' reaction and control of corruption; while voters in countries with parliamentary systems or with relatively low levels of democracy react negatively to an increase in corruption, no perceptible effect of this kind was found in countries with mature democracies, and the evidence is inconclusive in the case of countries with presidential systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Corruption And Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross‐Section Of Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 179-200, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:2:p:179-200
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2008.00341.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro C. Magalhães & Luís Aguiar-Conraria, 2017. "Procedural Fairness and Economic Voting," NIPE Working Papers 07/2017, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    2. Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Electoral cycles in perceived corruption: International empirical evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 215-224.
    3. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
    4. Zeena Mardawi & Guillermina Tormo‐Carbó & Elies Seguí‐Mas & Saed Al‐Koni, 2023. "Does corruption rule the auditor's soul? Examining the auditors' attitude toward accepting corruption behaviors," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 1070-1098, November.
    5. Chowdhury, Md Shahedur R. & Khraiche, Maroula & Boudreau, James W., 2023. "Corruption and stock market development: Developing vs. developed economies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    6. Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar, 2015. "A Replication of “Corruption and Elections," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(2), pages 143-154, March.
    7. Lavinia DudaÈ™ & Lavinia MihiÈ›, 2019. "What Shapes Elections and Corruption in Emerging and Developing Countries ?," Ovidius University Annals, Economic Sciences Series, Ovidius University of Constantza, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 0(1), pages 195-201, August.
    8. Luís Aguiar-Conraria & Pedro C. Magalhães, 2018. "Procedural Fairness, the Economy, and Support for Political Authorities (Forthcoming at Political Psychology (submitted pre-print version))," NIPE Working Papers 05/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.

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    Replication

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  • Rajeev K. Goel & Ummad Mazhar, 2015. "A Replication of “Corruption and Elections," Public Finance Review, , vol. 43(2), pages 143-154, March.
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