A model of voter choice in a life cycle setting
This paper employs an overlapping generations framework in which voters choose political parties based on the economic shocks faced over their lifetimes. Parties internalize voting preferences and develop platforms based on this information. The resulting equilibrium implies that voters select parties that maximize income in their labor period and that minimize inflation in their retirement period. The equilibrium also has the property that individuals switch their votes between the parties, in the presence of adverse states of nature. These results provide an explanation for post World War II voting patterns in the United States. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical findings. Copyright 1996 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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