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Corruption and Power in Democracies

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  • Francesco Giovannoni

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Abstract

According to Acton: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". We study the implications of Acton's dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton's dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which describe plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Giovannoni, 2012. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/624, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  • Handle: RePEc:bri:uobdis:12/624
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Testa, Cecilia, 2012. "Is polarization bad?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 1104-1118.
    2. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
    3. Stamatios Katsikas & Vassili Kolokoltsov & Wei Yang, 2016. "Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-25, October.
    4. V. N. Kolokoltsov & O. A. Malafeyev, 2017. "Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, pages 34-47.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Incumbency; Government Formation;

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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