The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-011-0613-y
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Citations
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Cited by:
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More about this item
Keywords
Campaign spending; Elections; Campaign limits; Political parties; D72; D78; C72;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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