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Corruption and power in democracies

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Listed author(s):
  • Francesco Giovannoni

    ()

  • Daniel Seidmann

    ()

Abstract

We study the implications of Acton’s dictum that power corrupts when citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. Our model entails various plausible predictions about long-run patterns of government. Acton’s dictum results in possible government turnover, and in different predictions about possible government composition: for example, that the grand coalition may form. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-013-0739-x
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Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 42 (2014)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 707-734

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:42:y:2014:i:3:p:707-734
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0739-x
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Goodin, Robert E. & G Th, Werner & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2008. "When to Coalesce: Early Versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 181-191, January.
  2. Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2004. "An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 783-797, March.
  3. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjöström, 2013. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 7, pages 129-181 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 2006. "Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(4), pages 727-742, December.
  5. Steven J. Brams & Michael A. Jones & D. Marc Kilgour, 2002. "Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 14(3), pages 359-383, July.
  6. Seidmann, Daniel J., 2008. "Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 448-455, April.
  7. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
  8. Hauk, Esther & Saez-Marti, Maria, 2002. "On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 311-335, December.
  9. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
  10. Stefan Krause & Fabio Méndez, 2009. "Corruption And Elections: An Empirical Study For A Cross-Section Of Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(2), pages 179-200, 07.
  11. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. "Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-336, June.
  12. Cristina Bicchieri & John Duffy, 1997. "Corruption Cycles," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 477-495.
  13. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
  14. Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994. "On the Measurement of Polarization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 819-851, July.
  15. Herrera, Helios & Levine, David K. & Martinelli, César, 2008. "Policy platforms, campaign spending and voter participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 501-513, April.
  16. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January.
  17. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
  18. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  19. Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, 2008. "Causes of corruption: a survey of cross-country analyses and extended results," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 245-263, July.
  20. Baron, David P. & Diermeier, Daniel & Fong, Pohan, 2007. "Policy Dynamics and Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representation," Research Papers 1960, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  21. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
  22. David Baron & Daniel Diermeier & Pohan Fong, 2012. "A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 703-738, April.
  23. Golder, Sona Nadenichek, 2006. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(02), pages 193-212, April.
  24. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
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Cited by:

  1. Testa, Cecilia, 2012. "Is polarization bad?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1104-1118.
  2. Stamatios Katsikas & Vassili Kolokoltsov & Wei Yang, 2016. "Evolutionary Inspection and Corruption Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(4), pages 1-25, October.
  3. Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014. "Corruption and power in democracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
  4. V. N. Kolokoltsov & O. A. Malafeyev, 2017. "Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 34-47, March.

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