On the Optimal Number of Representatives
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9801-3
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- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012. "On the optimal number of representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 419-445, December.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Discussion Papers 1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Malik Magdon-Ismail & Lirong Xia, 2018. "A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy," Papers 1807.06157, arXiv.org.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011.
"Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
- Piolatto, Amedeo, 2008. "Electoral systems and the distortion of voters' preferences," MPRA Paper 12610, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2009.
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: which is most representative of voters?," Working Papers 2009/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Wenruo Lyu & Liang Zhao, 2023. "Axioms and Divisor Methods for a Generalized Apportionment Problem with Relative Equality," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(15), pages 1-13, July.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008.
"Central bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 817-832, December.
- Mr. Helge Berger & Mr. Tonny Lybek & Volker Nitsch, 2006. "Central Bank Boards Around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," IMF Working Papers 2006/281, International Monetary Fund.
- Berger, Helge & Nitsch, Volker & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank boards around the world: Why does membership size differ?," Discussion Papers 2008/5, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Helge Berger & Volker Nitsch & Tonny Lybek, 2007. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1897, CESifo.
- Nitsch, Volker & Berger, Helge & Lybek, Tonny, 2008. "Central Bank Boards around the World: Why Does Membership Size Differ?," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 34446, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003.
"Committee Design in the Presence of Communication,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1411, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2004. "Committee Design in the Presence of Communication," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm351, Yale School of Management.
- Pascal Langenbach & Tobias Rommel, 2023. "Even in the best of both worlds, you can't have it all: How German voters navigate the trilemma of mixed-member proportionality," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2023_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012.
"On the optimal number of representatives,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 419-445, December.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Discussion Papers 1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Post-Print hal-03565398, HAL.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2007.
"On Robust Constitution Design,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 241-279, May.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2001. "On Robust Constitution Design," IDEI Working Papers 136, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Aug 2006.
- Gary-Bobo, Robert J. & Auriol, Emmanuelle, 2002. "On Robust Constitution Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3303, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2008.
"Information acquisition in committees,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 436-459, March.
- Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Andreas Bergh & Günther Fink & Richard Öhrvall, 2017. "More politicians, more corruption: evidence from Swedish municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 483-500, September.
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More about this item
Keywords
Representative democracy; Number of representatives; Constitution design; Incentives;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
Statistics
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