IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2023_07.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Even in the best of both worlds, you can't have it all: How German voters navigate the trilemma of mixed-member proportionality

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Langenbach

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Tobias Rommel

    (Technical University of Munich)

Abstract

The fragmentation of the party system has confronted the German mixed-member proportional electoral system with a trilemma. It can only ensure two out of three goals: proportionality, guaranteed representation of district winners, and a fixed and predictable size of the Bundestag. This paper studies how citizens position themselves in this trilemma. Using original survey data, we find that all goals are popular and no combination of goals commands majority support. This suggests that electoral reform is politically difficult not only because of the self-interest of parties but also because of widely perceived trade-offs. At the same time, our findings indicate that voters can be a constructive force for reform. More knowledgeable voters can form coherent and meaningful preferences over electoral rules. Voters are also receptive to the logical constraints of the system: informing respondents about the trilemma trade-offs in an experimental setting makes them more accepting of reform proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Langenbach & Tobias Rommel, 2023. "Even in the best of both worlds, you can't have it all: How German voters navigate the trilemma of mixed-member proportionality," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2023_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2023_07
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2023_07online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert Gary-Bobo, 2012. "On the optimal number of representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 419-445, December.
    2. Frieden, Jeffry A., 1991. "Invested interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(4), pages 425-451, October.
    3. Cavaillé, Charlotte & Chen, Daniel L. & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2022. "Who Cares? Measuring Preference Intensity in a Polarized Environment," IAST Working Papers 22-130, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gabriella Montinola & Ramon Moreno, 2001. "The political economy of foreign bank entry and its impact: theory and a case study," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 2001-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    2. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    3. Federico Maria Ferrara & Jörg S Haas & Andrew Peterson & Thomas Sattler, 2022. "Exports vs. Investment: How Public Discourse Shapes Support for External Imbalances," Post-Print hal-02569351, HAL.
    4. Jean-Philippe Bonardi & Santiago Urbiztondo & Bertrand V. Quelin, 2009. "The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(2), pages 232-256.
    5. Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
    6. Benjamin A. T. Graham & Noel P. Johnston & Allison F. Kingsley, 2018. "Even Constrained Governments Take," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(8), pages 1784-1813, September.
    7. Seghezza, Elena & Morelli, Pierluigi & Pittaluga, Giovanni B., 2017. "Reserve accumulation and exchange rate policy in China: The authoritarian elite's aim of political survival," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 40-51.
    8. Aparicio, Sebastian & Audretsch, David & Noguera, Maria & Urbano, David, 2022. "Can female entrepreneurs boost social mobility in developing countries? An institutional analysis," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    9. Talani, Leila Simona, 2014. "The Political Economy of Italy in the EMU: What Went Wrong?," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 1(2), pages 133-149.
    10. Michaël Aklin & Eric Arias & Julia Gray, 2022. "Inflation concerns and mass preferences over exchange‐rate policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 5-40, March.
    11. Pierre-Guillaume Meon, 2009. "Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(18), pages 2369-2384.
    12. Manuela Moschella, 2015. "Currency wars in the advanced world: Resisting appreciation at a time of change in central banking monetary consensus," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 134-161, February.
    13. Kyoung‐Hee Yu & Frank Levy, 2010. "Offshoring Professional Services: Institutions and Professional Control," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(4), pages 758-783, December.
    14. Guisinger, Alexandra & Singer, David Andrew, 2010. "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 313-337, April.
    15. Dieter Ernst & Bengt-åke Lundvall, 2004. "Information Technology in the Learning Economy: Challenges for Developing Countries," Chapters, in: Erik S. Reinert (ed.), Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Cornelia Woll, 2013. "Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation," Post-Print hal-02186537, HAL.
    17. repec:onb:oenbwp:y::i:39:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Geoffrey Minne, 2014. "Mark my Words: Information and the Fear of Declaring one’s Exchange Rate Regime," Post-Print CEB, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 107, pages 244-261, March.
    19. Arnold, Patricia J. & Sikka, Prem, 2001. "Globalization and the state-profession relationship: the case the Bank of Credit and Commerce International," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 475-499, August.
    20. Hyoung-kyu Chey, 2013. "The Concepts, Consequences, and Determinants of Currency Internationalization," GRIPS Discussion Papers 13-03, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
    21. Jäger, Kai, 2016. "The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 79-96.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2023_07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marc Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.