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Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon

Abstract

This paper analyses the voting and abstention patterns in French departments in the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht treaty, in light of the potential impact of monetary union. We observe that departmental characteristics implying either greater benefits or lower costs from monetary union are significantly correlated with the approval rate. This supports the view that the voting behavior of individual agents depended on their self-interest. The impact of economic characteristics on the abstention rate is less clear. Indeed, the variable that is most significantly correlated with abstention in the referendum is average abstention in other elections.

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  • Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2005. "Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty," DULBEA Working Papers 05-02.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:dul:wpaper:05-02rs
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    1. Barry Nalebuff & Ron Shachar, 1999. "Follow the Leader: Theory and Evidence on Political Participation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 525-547, June.
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    5. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
    6. Vlachos, Jonas, 2004. "Who wants political integration?: Evidence from the Swedish EU-membership referendum," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1589-1604, July.
    7. Eichenberg, Richard C. & Dalton, Russell J., 1993. "Europeans and the European Community: the dynamics of public support for European integration," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 507-534, October.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Charles Plaigin, 2009. "Exploratory study on the presence of cultural and institutional growth spillovers," DULBEA Working Papers 09-03.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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