Who Wants Political Integration? Evidence from the Swedish EU-Membership Referendum
The regional voting pattern of the Swedish EU-membership referendum is analyzed to determine voters' preferences over two fiscal regimes: an autonomous Sweden, or Sweden as part of the EU. A major difference between these regimes is that autonomy gives greater national discretion to handle risk-sharing and redistribution between regions. I find that inhabitants of rich and stable regions, with high levels of schooling, small receipts of central government transfers, and trade relations displaying comparative advantages towards the EU were relatively positive to membership. A plausible interpretation is thus that voters in safe and rich regions voted in favor of dismantling the Swedish transfer system.
|Date of creation:||04 May 2003|
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