Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule
A plurality-rule spatial committee can select an extreme decision if a bare minority of members prefer the opposite extreme decision: the majority who prefer a moderate decision are immobilised by internal divisions. Consequently, a nominator may appoint candidates with the opposite preference ordering so as to build up the bare minority. Our results may explain why Disraeli extended the franchise to skilled male workers in 1867 against centrist opposition; and why an electorate whose preferences are not polarized may have to choose between extremist candidates.
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