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Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict

Listed author(s):
  • Sayantan Ghosal

    ()

  • Eugenio Proto

    ()

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democ- racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so- cial surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democ- racy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are sufficiently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.

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File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/342708/CEDI_08-09.pdf
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Paper provided by Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University in its series CEDI Discussion Paper Series with number 08-09.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:08-09
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