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Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938

  • Aidt, Toke S.

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics)

  • Jensen, Peter S.

    ()

    (Department of Business and Economics)

This paper tests the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise was caused by the threat of revolution, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000). We approximate the threat of revolution in a given country by revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries. We investigate the relationship between this new measure of the threat of revolution and measures of suffrage reform in two samples of European countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938. We find strong support for the ‘threat of revolution theory’. We also find some evidence that war triggered suffrage reform, whereas ‘modernization theory’ receives little support.

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File URL: http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//C/4/B/%7BC4B9B18D-95B6-4BFB-A384-A20F617EFD4E%7Ddpbe7_2010.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 7/2010.

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Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 18 Oct 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2010_007
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Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark

Phone: 65 50 32 33
Fax: 65 50 32 37
Web page: http://www.sdu.dk/ivoe
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