From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization
The secret ballot is one of the cornerstones of democracy. We contend that the historical process of modernization caused the switch from open to secret ballot with the underlying mechanism being that income growth, urbanization, and rising education standards undermined vote markets and made electoral corruption uneconomical. We undertake event history studies of ballot reform in Western Europe and the Americas during the 19th and 20th centuries to establish that modernization was systematically related to ballot reform. We study electoral turnout before and after ballot reform amongst the US states and British parliamentary constituencies to substantiate the hypothesis that modernization made vote buying uneconomical.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2008.
"Income and Democracy,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 808-42, June.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson & Pierre Yared, 2005. "Income and Democracy," NBER Working Papers 11205, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Yared, Pierre, 2005. "Income and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 5273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barro, Robert J., 1999.
"Determinants of Democracy,"
3451297, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009.
"Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, November.
- Oded Galor & Omer Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2009.
"Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 143-179.
- Oded Galor & Omar Moav & Dietrich Vollrath, 2006. "Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_001, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Galor, Oded & Moav, Omer & Vollrath, Dietrich, 2008. "Inequality in Land Ownership, the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions and the Great Divergence," CEPR Discussion Papers 6751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Congleton,Roger D., 2011.
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521151696, November.
- Jean-Marie Baland & James A. Robinson, 2006.
"Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile,"
NBER Working Papers
12517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2014.
"Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-75.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2010. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820-1938," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 7/2010, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
- Aidt, T.S. & Jensen, P.S., 2011. "Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1102, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Toke Aidt & Peter S. Jensen, 2011. "Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Extensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938," CESifo Working Paper Series 3417, CESifo Group Munich.
- François Bourguignon & Christian Morrisson, 2001.
"Inequality among World Citizens : 1820-1992,"
DELTA Working Papers
2001-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- John R. Lott & Jr. & Lawrence W. Kenny, 1999. "Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1163-1198, December.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2009. "The taxman tools up: An event history study of the introduction of the personal income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 160-175, February.
- Eddie Dekel & Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 2008. "Vote Buying: General Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 351-380, 04.
- Jess Benhabib & Alejandro Corvalan & Mark M. Spiegel, 2011.
"Reestablishing the Income-Democracy Nexus,"
NBER Working Papers
16832, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Braun, Sebastian & Kvasnicka, Michael, 2010.
"Men, women, and the ballot: Gender imbalances and suffrage extensions in US states,"
Kiel Working Papers
1625, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Sebastian Braun & Michael Kvasnicka, 2010. "Men, Women, and the Ballot. Gender Imbalances and Suffrage Extensions in US States," Kiel Working Papers 1625, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Berlinski, Samuel & Dewan, Torun, 2011. "The Political Consequences of Franchise Extension: Evidence from the Second Reform Act," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 6(3–4), pages 329-376, November.
- Aidt, Toke S. & Eterovic, Dalibor S., 2011. "Political competition, electoral participation and public finance in 20th century Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 181-200, March.
- Jac C. Heckelman & Andrew J. Yates, 2002. "Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 47-57, 03.
- Evelyne Huber & Dietrich Rueschemeyer & John D. Stephens, 1993. "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 71-86, Summer.
- Heckelman, J C, 1995. "The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 107-24, January.
- Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2009.
"Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications,"
SIRE Discussion Papers
2009-41, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
- Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(03), pages 645-670, July.
- Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2009. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," Working Papers 0918, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
- Paul Collier & Pedro Vicente, 2012. "Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 117-147, October.
- Chad Turner & Robert Tamura & Sean Mulholland & Scott Baier, 2007. "Education and income of the states of the United States: 1840–2000," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 101-158, June.
- Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:1221. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.