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Social Insurance Expansion and Political Regime Dynamics in Europe, 1880–1945

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  • Wonik Kim

Abstract

Objectives. This article analyzes the causal relationship between political regime dynamics and social insurance expansion. I theorize that the social insurance expansion is the result of the ruling elites' strategic decision about regime change to dispel revolutionary motives. The key testable implication is that social insurance expansion is more likely to happen under a democratic regime, which, in turn, is influenced by the threat of social revolution evinced by strike activities. Methods. Using historical data on social insurance coverage from 12 European countries from 1880 to 1945, I test the hypothesis employing a treatment‐effects model that endogenizes democratization. Results. I find a positive association between social insurance expansion and democracy, controlling for other political mechanisms. Furthermore, I find that democratic transition is greatly influenced by the duration and intensity of strikes. Conclusion. This study suggests that social insurance expansion requires a link between a threat of revolution and democratization.

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  • Wonik Kim, 2007. "Social Insurance Expansion and Political Regime Dynamics in Europe, 1880–1945," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 88(2), pages 494-514, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:88:y:2007:i:2:p:494-514
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2007.00468.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mares,Isabela, 2003. "The Politics of Social Risk," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521534772.
    2. Mares,Isabela, 2003. "The Politics of Social Risk," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521827416.
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    1. Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2014. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-75.
    2. Stefan Houpt & Juan Carlos Rojo Cagigal, 2012. "‘You can't start a fire without a spark’: strikes and class struggle in the Basque Country, 1914-36," Working Papers 12012, Economic History Society.
    3. Toke Aidt & Stanley L. Winer & Peng Zhang, 2020. "Franchise Extension and Fiscal Structure in the United Kingdom 1820-1913: A New Test of the Redistribution Hypothesis," CESifo Working Paper Series 8114, CESifo.
    4. Profeta, Paola & Puglisi, Riccardo & Scabrosetti, Simona, 2013. "Does democracy affect taxation and government spending? Evidence from developing countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 684-718.

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