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Information Cascades and Revolutionary Regime Transitions

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  • Christopher J. Ellis
  • John Fender

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Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2011. "Information Cascades and Revolutionary Regime Transitions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(553), pages 763-792, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:121:y:2011:i:553:p:763-792
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Urban J. Jermann & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2006. "Financial innovations and macroeconomic volatility," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    2. Stephen G Cecchetti & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Stefan Krause, 2005. "Assessing the Sources of Changes in the Volatility of Real Growth," RBA Annual Conference Volume,in: Christopher Kent & David Norman (ed.), The Changing Nature of the Business Cycle Reserve Bank of Australia.
    3. Iacoviello, Matteo & Pavan, Marina, 2013. "Housing and debt over the life cycle and over the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 221-238.
    4. Jonathan McCarthy & Richard Peach, 2002. "Monetary policy transmission to residential investment," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue May, pages 139-158.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aidt, Toke S. & Jensen, Peter S., 2014. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 52-75.
    2. Anna Maria Koukal & Reiner Eichenberger, 2017. "Explaining a Paradox of Democracy: The Role of Institutions in Female Enfranchisement," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    3. Aidt, Toke & Albornoz, Facundo & Gassebner, Martin, 2010. "The Golden Halo and Political Transitions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Hannover 2010 48, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    4. Etienne Farvaque & Alexander Mihailov & Alireza Naghavi, 2011. "The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency," Working Papers 2011.70, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Mehdi Shadmehr & Peter Haschke, 2016. "Youth, Revolution, And Repression," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 778-793, April.
    6. Rubin, Jared, 2014. "Centralized institutions and cascades," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 340-357.
    7. Buchheim, Lukas & Ulbricht, Robert, 2014. "Dynamics of Political Systems," TSE Working Papers 14-464, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2016.
    8. Paul Maarek & Michael Dorsch, 2012. "Inefficient Predation, Information, and Contagious Institutional Change," THEMA Working Papers 2012-32, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    9. Sangnier, Marc & Zylberberg, Yanos, 2017. "Protests and trust in the state: Evidence from African countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 55-67.
    10. Michael D. Makowsky & Jared Rubin, 2011. "An Agent-Based Model of Centralized Institutions, Social Network Technology, and Revolution," Working Papers 2011-05, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2011.
    11. Michael Dorsch & Paul Maarek, 2016. "Democratization and the conditional dynamics of income distribution," Working Papers hal-01350968, HAL.
    12. Frederik Toscani, 2013. "Why High Human Capital Makes Good Revolutionaries: The Role of the Middle Classes in Democratisation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1332, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    13. De Luca, Giacomo & Litina, Anastasia & Sekeris, Petros G., 2015. "Growth-friendly dictatorships," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, pages 98-111.
    14. Paul Maarek & Michael Dorsch & Karl Dunz, 2012. "Macro Shocks, Regulatory Quality and Costly Political Action," THEMA Working Papers 2012-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    15. Dorsch, Michael T. & Maarek, Paul, 2015. "Inefficient predation and political transitions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 37-48.
    16. Etienne Farvaque & Alexander Mihailov & Alireza Naghavi, 2011. "The Grand Experiment of Communism: Discovering the Trade-off between Equality and Efficiency," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2011-02, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    17. Paul Maarek & Michael T. Dorsch, 2015. "Rent seeking, revolutionary threat and coups in non-democracies," THEMA Working Papers 2015-13, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    18. Christopher J Ellis & John Fender, 2010. "Information Aggregation, Growth and Franchise Extension with Applications to Female Enfranchisement and Inequality," Discussion Papers 10-27, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    19. Thampanishvong Kannika, 2012. "Provision of Public Goods with the Presence of Inter-Class Conflicts," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, April.
    20. Michael Dorsch & Karl Dunz & Paul Maarek, 2015. "Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 381-404, March.
    21. repec:spr:sochwe:v:49:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1067-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Paul Maarek & Michael Dorsch & Karl Dunz, 2012. "Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Regulation of Firms Under the Threat of Revolution," THEMA Working Papers 2012-42, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    23. Platteau, Jean-Phillipe & Sekeris, Petros G., 2013. "Seduction of Religious Clerics and Violence in Autocratic Regimes - with special emphasis on Islam," NEPS Working Papers 3/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    24. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Extremism in revolutionary movements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 97-121.

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