IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

War and Endogenous Democracy

  • Ticchi, Davide

    (U of Urbino)

  • Vindigni, Andrea

    (Princeton U)

Many episodes of extension of franchise in the 19th and especially in the 20th century occurred during or in the aftermath of major wars. Motivated by this fact, we offer a theory of political transitions which focuses on the impact of international conflicts on domestic political institutions. We argue that mass-armies, which appeared in Europe after the French Revolution, are an effective military organization only if the conscripted citizens are willing to put effort into fighting wars, which in turn depends on the economic incentives that are provided to them. The need to provide such incentives implies that an oligarchy adopting a mass-army may voluntarily decide to promise some amount of income redistribution to its citizens, conditionally on satisfactory performance as soldiers. When the elite cannot credibly commit to provide an incentive-compatible redistribution, they may cope with the moral hazard problem of the citizen-soldiers only by relinquishing political power to them through the extension of franchise. This is because democracy always implements a highly redistributive fiscal policy, which makes fighting hard incentive-compatible for the citizen-soldiers. We show that a transition to democracy is more likely to occur when the external threat faced by an incumbent oligarchy is in some sense intermediate. A very high external threat allows the elite to make credible commitments of future income redistribution in favor of the citizens, while a limited external threat makes it optimal for the elite not to make any (economic or political) concession to the masses. Some historical evidence consistent with our theory is also provided.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://weblamp.princeton.edu/rppe/files/wars.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Can't connect to weblamp.princeton.edu:80. If this is indeed the case, please notify ()


Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy in its series Papers with number 03-10-2008b.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-10-2008b
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://weblamp.princeton.edu/rppe/papers/papers.php

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Zanola, Roberto, 2007. "The Dynamics of Art Prices: The Selection Corrected Repeat-Sales Index," POLIS Working Papers 76, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  2. Lotito, Gianna, 2007. "Resolute Choice in interaction: a qualitative experiment," POLIS Working Papers 94, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  3. Ortona, Guido & Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio & Scacciati, Francesco, 2006. "Labour supply in presence of taxation financing public services. An experimental approach," POLIS Working Papers 71, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  4. Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2007. "Simulating voting rule reforms for the Italian parliament. An economic perspective," POLIS Working Papers 88, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  5. Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2007. "War and Endogenous Democracy," Working Papers 0715, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2007.
  6. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1998. "Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 1797, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Cugno Franco & Ottoz Elisabetta, 2006. "Static Inefficiency of Compulsory Licensing: Quantity vs. Price Competition," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 200606, University of Turin.
  8. Nicita, Antonio & Ramello, Giovanni B., 2006. "Property, liability and market power: The antitrust side of copyright," POLIS Working Papers 75, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  9. Roberto Zanola, 2010. "Major influences on circus attendance," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 159-170, February.
  10. Thomas Piketty, 2003. "Income Inequality in France, 1901-1998," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1004-1042, October.
  11. Carla Marchese, 2009. "Rewarding the Consumer for Curbing the Evasion of Commodity Taxes?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 65(4), pages 383-402, December.
  12. Bissey, Marie-Edith & Ortona, Guido, 2007. "The program for the simulation of electoral systems ALEX4.1: what it does and how to use it," POLIS Working Papers 82, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  13. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  14. Brosio, Giorgio & Zanola, Roberto, 2006. "Can violence be rational? An empirical analysis of Colombia," POLIS Working Papers 74, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  15. Edward L. Glaeser, 2006. "The Political Economy of Warfare," NBER Working Papers 12738, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Stefania Ottone, 2008. "Are people Samaritans or Avengers?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(10), pages 1-3.
  17. Ottone, Stefania & Ponzano, Ferruccio, 2007. "Non-self-centered inequity aversion matters. A model," POLIS Working Papers 91, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  18. Ramello, Giovanni B., 2007. "Access to vs. exclusion from knowledge: Intellectual property, efficiency and social justice," POLIS Working Papers 90, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  19. Bia, Michela & Mattei, Alessandra, 2007. "Application of the Generalized Propensity Score. Evaluation of public contributions to Piedmont enterprises," POLIS Working Papers 80, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  20. Breton, Albert & Scott, Anthony & Fraschini, Angela, 2007. "Explaining differences in environmental governance patterns between Canada, Italy and the United States," POLIS Working Papers 87, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  21. Bia, Michela, 2007. "The Propensity Score method in public policy evaluation: a survey," POLIS Working Papers 79, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:prirpe:03-10-2008b. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.