IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/gmonwp/halshs-00967428.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial Liberalization, Elite Heterogeneity and Political Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Nauro Campos

    (Brunel University - Brunel University, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, IZA - IZA)

  • Fabrizio Coricelli

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)

Abstract

What accounts for the dynamics of financial reforms? This paper identifies the political regime as main factor. Focusing on democratization and financial reform, it puts forward novel evidence for a U-shaped relation, across countries, over time as well as in a panel setting for different reform measures and a wide range of estimators. Partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms and democratization, when incomplete, may lead to severe financial reform reversals. We also show that, even when de jure set off de facto financial liberalization, the political regime still play a fundamental role in the reform's implementation phase.

Suggested Citation

  • Nauro Campos & Fabrizio Coricelli, 2010. "Financial Liberalization, Elite Heterogeneity and Political Reform," PSE - G-MOND WORKING PAPERS halshs-00967428, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:gmonwp:halshs-00967428
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00967428
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00967428/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elias Papaioannou & Gregorios Siourounis, 2008. "Democratisation and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1520-1551, October.
    2. Loayza, Norman V. & Ranciere, Romain, 2006. "Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 1051-1076, June.
    3. Ghosal, Sayantan & Proto, Eugenio, 2009. "Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1078-1089, October.
    4. Kose, M. Ayhan & Prasad, Eswar & Rogoff, Kenneth & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2010. "Financial Globalization and Economic Policies," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier.
    5. Dewatripont, Mathias & Roland, Gerard, 1995. "The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1207-1223, December.
    6. Campos, Nauro F & Horváth, Roman, 2006. "Reform Redux: Measurement, Determinants and Reversals," IZA Discussion Papers 2093, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Kaminsky, Graciela Laura & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2002. "Short-run pain, long-run gain : the effects of financial liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2912, The World Bank.
    8. Jorge Braga De Macedo & Joaquim Oliveira Martins, 2008. "Growth, reform indicators and policy complementarities," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 16(2), pages 141-164, April.
    9. Abdul Abiad & Ashoka Mody, 2005. "Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 66-88, March.
    10. Raghuram G. Rajan, 2009. "Rent Preservation and the Persistence of Underdevelopment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 178-218, January.
    11. Nauro F. Campos & Abrizio Coricelli, 2002. "Growth in Transition: What We Know, What We Don't, and What We Should," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 793-836, September.
    12. Giovannini, Alberto & de Melo, Martha, 1993. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 953-963, September.
    13. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7960 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. David Epstein & Robert H. Bates & Jack Goldstone & Ida Kristensen & Sharyn O'Halloran, 2004. "Democratic Transitions," CID Working Papers 101, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:gmonwp:halshs-00967428. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.