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Information Aggregation, Growth, And Franchise Extension With Applications To Female Enfranchisement And Inequality

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  • Christopher Ellis
  • John Fender

Abstract

type="main"> We develop a model of voluntary gradual franchise extension and growth based on the idea that voting is an information aggregation mechanism. A larger number of voters means that more correct decisions are made, hence increasing output, but also implies that any incremental output must be shared among more individuals. These conflicting incentives lead to a dynamic model of franchise extensions that is consistent with several real world episodes, including female enfranchisement. The model also predicts that in certain circumstances growth and enfranchisement will be accompanied by Kuznets curve type behaviour in inequality. Contrary to the preceding literature these conclusions do not rest on incentives for strategic delegation.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Ellis & John Fender, 2016. "Information Aggregation, Growth, And Franchise Extension With Applications To Female Enfranchisement And Inequality," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 239-267, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:68:y:2016:i:3:p:239-267
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    References listed on IDEAS

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