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Democratic Errors

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher J. Ellis

    () (University of Oregon)

  • John Fender

Abstract

In this paper we combine AcemogluÂ’s model of the economic origins of democracy with LohmannÂ’s model of political massprotest. This alllows us to provide ananalysis of the economic causes of political regimec hange based on the micro foundations of rebellion. We are able tod erive conditons under which democracy arises peacefully, when it occurs only after a violent rebellion, and when oligarchy persists. We model these posibilities in a world of asymmetric information where information cascades are possible, and where these cascades may involve errors in a paratian sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2008. "Democratic Errors," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2008-2, University of Oregon Economics Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2008-2
    as

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    File URL: http://economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2008-2_Ellis_Democratic_Errors.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Humberto Llavador & Robert J. Oxoby, 2005. "Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(3), pages 1155-1189.
    2. Jack, William & Lagunoff, Roger, 2006. "Dynamic enfranchisement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 551-572.
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    4. Stanley Fischer & Ratna Sahay & Carlos A. Végh, 2002. "Modern Hyper- and High Inflations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 837-880.
    5. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    6. Jody Overland & Kenneth Simons & Michael Spagat, 2005. "Political instability and growth in dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 445-470, December.
    7. Aftalion,Florin, 1990. "The French Revolution," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521368100, December.
    8. Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-530, June.
    9. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    10. Mau, Vladimir & Starodubrovskaia, Irina, 2001. "The Challenge of Revolution: Contemporary Russia in Historical Perspective," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199241507.
    11. Subir Bose & Gerhard Orosel & Marco Ottaviani & Lise Vesterlund, 2006. "Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 910-928, December.
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    13. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    14. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422, December.
    15. Sargent, Thomas J & Velde, Francois R, 1995. "Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 474-518, June.
    16. Christopher J. Ellis & John Fender, 2014. "Public Sector Capital and the Transition from Dictatorship to Democracy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(3), pages 322-346, June.
    17. Chamley, Christophe & Gale, Douglas, 1994. "Information Revelation and Strategic Delay in a Model of Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1065-1085.
    18. John P. Conley & Akram Temimi, 2001. "Endogenous Enfranchisement When Groups' Preferences Conflict," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 79-102, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Democracy; Information Cascades; Rebellion;

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • P4 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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