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Lobbying, corruption and political influence

  • Nauro Campos
  • Francesco Giovannoni

    ()

Conventional wisdom is that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for almost 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes; (b) firm size, age and ownership as well as political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying is a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in less developed countries. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-006-9102-4
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 131 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 1-21

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:131:y:2007:i:1:p:1-21
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-9102-4
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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