IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v155y2013i1p19-41.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”

Author

Listed:
  • William Pyle

    ()

  • Laura Solanko

Abstract

Why are some business lobbies less benign in their external effects than others? In The rise and decline of nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982 ), Mancur Olson proposed that less-encompassing groups—i.e., those whose constituents collectively represent a relatively narrow range of interests—have a greater interest in seeking the types of subsidies, tariffs, tax loopholes, and competition-limiting regulations that, while benefiting their members, impose costs on the rest of society. By drawing on a unique pair of surveys—one targeted to managers of Russian regional lobbies, and the other addressed to managers of Russian industrial enterprises—we provide what we believe to be the most direct test of this hypothesis to date. The pattern of responses is striking. Managers of both the less encompassing lobbies and the enterprises belonging to those types of organizations display stronger preferences for narrowly targeted policy interventions. Our results, that is, strongly support Olson’s hypothesis. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:1:p:19-41
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-011-9823-x
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Endogenous Lobbying," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, March.
    3. Anna Maria Mayda, 2006. "Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(3), pages 510-530, August.
    4. Berkowitz, Daniel & DeJong, David N., 2003. "Policy reform and growth in post-Soviet Russia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 337-352, April.
    5. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June.
    6. Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, September.
    7. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    8. Nauro Campos & Francesco Giovannoni, 2007. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 1-21, April.
    9. Dennis Coates & Jac Heckelman & Bonnie Wilson, 2011. "Special-interest groups and growth," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 439-457, June.
    10. Mayda, Anna Maria & Rodrik, Dani, 2005. "Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1393-1430, August.
    11. repec:cup:apsrev:v:98:y:2004:i:04:p:593-611_04 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 587-611, August.
    13. Guriev, Sergei & Yakovlev, Evgeny & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2010. "Interest group politics in a federation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 730-748, October.
    14. Berkowitz, Daniel & DeJong, David N., 2003. "Regional integration: an empirical assessment of Russia," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 541-559, May.
    15. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2008. "Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 215-239, July.
    16. Irina Slinko & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya & Evgeny Yakovlev, 2005. "Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 284-318.
    17. Daniel Horgos & Klaus Zimmermann, 2009. "Interest groups and economic performance: some new evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 301-315, March.
    18. William Pyle, 2011. "Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 2-31.
    19. K. H. O'Rourke & R. Sinnott, 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence," CEG Working Papers 20016, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    20. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
    21. Thomas F. Rutherford & David G. Tarr, 2014. "Poverty effects of Russia's WTO accession: Modeling “real” households with endogenous productivity effects," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: APPLIED TRADE POLICY MODELING IN 16 COUNTRIES Insights and Impacts from World Bank CGE Based Projects, chapter 12, pages 287-306 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    22. Laura Solanko, 2008. "Unequal fortunes: a note on income convergence across Russian regions," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 287-301.
    23. Giovanni Maggi & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December.
    24. Sergei Guriev & Andrei Rachinsky, 2005. "The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 131-150, Winter.
    25. repec:cup:apsrev:v:89:y:1995:i:04:p:898-913_09 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    27. Jac C. Heckelman, 2007. "Explaining the Rain: The Rise and Decline of Nations after 25 Years," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 18-33, July.
    28. Doner Richard F. & Schneider Ben Ross, 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-29, December.
    29. Bischoff, Ivo, 2003. "Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Theoretical Considerations and Evidence from 21 OECD Countries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(1-2), pages 197-218, January.
    30. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    31. Kevin Milligan & Marie Rekkas, 2008. "Campaign spending limits, incumbent spending, and election outcomes," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1351-1374, November.
    32. O'Rourke, Kevin H. & Sinnott, Richard, 2006. "The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 838-861, December.
    33. Doner, Richard F. & Schneider, Ben Ross, 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 261-288, November.
    34. J. Barkley Rosser Jr, 2007. "The Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson's View of The Rise and Decline of Nations," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 4-17, July.
    35. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:nwe:eajour:y:2017:i:4:p:495-514 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. World Bank, 2013. "Russian Federation : National and Regional Trends in Regulatory Burden and Corruption," World Bank Other Operational Studies 16566, The World Bank.
    3. Markus Leibrecht & Silvia Rocha-Akis, 2014. "Social Partnership and Macroeconomic Performance," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 47406.
    4. Andrei Govorun & Israel Marques & William Pyle, 2013. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian firms and business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 46/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. repec:bpj:buspol:v:18:y:2016:i:4:p:395-433:n:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mancur Olson; Business lobbies; Lobbying; Encompassing; Russia; D71; D72;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:155:y:2013:i:1:p:19-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.