IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hig/wpaper/32-ps-2016.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Rochlitz

    () (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

What role can collective action by foreign investors play in an environment characterized by incomplete institutions? We study this question by looking on foreign business associations in the Russian Federation. By interviewing 17 foreign business associations and conducting an online survey of their member firms, we find that business associations play an important welfare-enhancing role in providing a series of support and informational services. However, they do not play a significant role in lobbying the collective interests of their member firms, especially in the current political context in Russia where since the start of the Ukraine crisis the business community seems to have suffered a general loss of influence on political decision making

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:32/ps/2016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.hse.ru/data/2016/02/02/1136690541/32PS2016.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Weymouth, Stephen, 2012. "Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(04), pages 1-26, December.
    2. Andrei Govorun & Israel Marques & William Pyle, 2013. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian firms and business associations," HSE Working papers WP BRP 46/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. repec:taf:ceasxx:v:58:y:2006:i:4:p:491-521 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    5. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Bat Batjargal, 2007. "Network triads: transitivity, referral and venture capital decisions in China and Russia," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 38(6), pages 998-1012, November.
    7. Rodolphe Desbordes & Julien Vauday, 2007. "The Political Influence Of Foreign Firms In Developing Countries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 421-451, November.
    8. Kanol, Direnç, 2015. "Social influence, competition and the act of lobbying," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(01), pages 75-96, April.
    9. William Pyle, 2011. "Organized Business, Political Competition, and Property Rights: Evidence from the Russian Federation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 2-31.
    10. Barber, Benjamin & Pierskalla, Jan & Weschle, Simon, 2014. "Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 221-246, August.
    11. Aisbett, Emma & McAusland, Carol, 2013. "Firm characteristics and influence on government rule-making: Theory and evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 214-235.
    12. Doner Richard F. & Schneider Ben Ross, 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-29, December.
    13. Calì, Massimiliano & Sen, Kunal, 2011. "Do Effective State Business Relations Matter for Economic Growth? Evidence from Indian States," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1542-1557, September.
    14. Doner, Richard F. & Schneider, Ben Ross, 2000. "Business Associations and Economic Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More Than Others," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(03), pages 261-288, November.
    15. Luo, Yadong, 2007. "From foreign investors to strategic insiders: Shifting parameters, prescriptions and paradigms for MNCs in China," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 14-34, March.
    16. Timothy Frye & John Reuter & David Szakonyi, 2012. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/PS/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    17. Mahmut Yasar & Roderick M. Rejesus & Yanjing Chen & Ujjayant Chakravorty, 2011. "Political Influence of Firms in the Tradables and Non‐Tradables Sectors: A Cross‐Country Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 297-312, November.
    18. Yasar, Mahmut, 2013. "Political Influence of Exporting and Import-Competing Firms: Evidence from Eastern European and Central Asian Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 154-168.
    19. William Pyle & Laura Solanko, 2013. "The composition and interests of Russia’s business lobbies: testing Olson’s hypothesis of the “encompassing organization”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 19-41, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1807 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective action; business associations; lobbying;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:32/ps/2016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamil Abdulaev) or (Victoria Elkina). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.