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Endogenous Lobbying Positions

Author

Listed:
  • Larry D. Qiu

Abstract

This paper develops a two‐country, two‐firm model to study equilibrium lobbying positions in intra‐industry trade. A firm chooses either a protectionist position or a free‐trade position. The model predicts that taking the free‐trade lobbying position is an efficient firm's dominant strategy. If two firms have high costs (or when the demand is very weak), there exist two equilibria: either both firms take the free‐trade position or both take the protectionist lobbying position. In other cases, both firms taking the free‐trade lobbying position is a unique equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry D. Qiu, 2008. "Endogenous Lobbying Positions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 641-653, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:4:p:641-653
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00769.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven Husted, 1991. "Foreign Lobbying: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 89-99, Jan-Mar.
    2. G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), 1995. "Handbook of International Economics," Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Larry D. Qiu, 2004. "Lobbying, multisector trade, and sustainability of free‐trade agreements," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 1061-1083, November.
    4. Hillman, Arye L. & Van Long, Ngo & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Protection, lobbying, and market structure," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 383-409, August.
    5. Katayama, Seiichi & Ursprung, Heinrich W., 2004. "Commercial culture, political culture and economic policy polarization: the case of Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 351-375, July.
    6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    7. Edward J. Ray, 1991. "Protection of Manufactures in the United States," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: David Greenaway & Robert C. Hine & Anthony P. O’Brien & Robert J. Thornton (ed.), Global Protectionism, chapter 2, pages 12-36, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2008. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 113-129, Springer.
    9. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
    2. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2014. "Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 81(2), pages 489-505, October.
    3. Bisson, Christophe & Calof, Jonathan & Boukef, Nabila, 2025. "Exploring the relationship between organizational agility, competitive intelligence and foresight as parts of an anticipatory system," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).

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