Rent-seeking and trade policy: An industry approach
The model of rent-seeking presented in this paper is consistent with the observation that labor and management in an industry almost always adopt the same position concerning the desirability of import protection versus trade liberalization. The paper also discusses the size of the returns to rent-seeking relative to the costs of lobbying, factors influencing the type of government assistance sought by an industry, and ways in which the benefits and costs of protection can be made more widely known to both the industries concerned and the general public.
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Volume (Year): 120 (1984)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Robert C. Feenstra & Jagdish N. Bhagwati, 1982. "Tariff Seeking and the Efficient Tariff," NBER Chapters,in: Import Competition and Response, pages 245-262 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Mayer, Wolfgang, 1974. "Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium for a Small Open Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(5), pages 955-967, Sept./Oct.
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- J. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1979. "Revenue-Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Working papers 243, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N., 1980. "Lobbying and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 355-363, December.
- Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
- Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, 1941. "Protection and Real Wages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 58-73.
- Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters,in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)