Influence of Political Campaign Contributions by American Agribusiness Firms on U.S. Farm Policy
This study adapts Ndayisenga and Kinsey's econometric model of the allocation of political campaign contributions by agribusiness firms. This model combines information on campaign contributions for political influence with the behavior assumption of profit maximization to test the hypotheses that agribusiness firms do not lobby against farm policies. Model results support the hypotheses and show that lobbying expenditure in output markets is statistically significant, and that political campaign contributions to the Democratic Party significantly correlate with agribusiness firms' profits. The conclusions of this study provide useful information about the intentions of agribusiness firms that participate in the political market, but the results should be carefully interpreted.
|Date of creation:||2002|
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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