The political economy of public utilities: A study of the power sector
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Cited by:
- N. Vijayamohanan Pillai & K.P. Kannan, 2001. "Time and cost over-runs of the power projects in Kerala," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 320, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
- K.P. Kannan & N. Vijayaymohanan Pillai, 2002. "The aetiology of the inefficiency syndrome in the Indian power sector: Main issues and conclusions of a study," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 324, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
- N. Vijayamohanan Pillai, 2004. "CES function, generalised mean and human poverty index: Exploring some links," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 360, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
- K.P. Kannan & N. Vijayamohanan Pillai, 2004. "Development as a right to freedom: An interpretation of the 'Kerala Model'," Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum Working Papers 361, Centre for Development Studies, Trivendrum, India.
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More about this item
Keywords
India; political economy; rent seeking; principal-agent; public utility; power sector;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E11 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Marxian; Sraffian; Kaleckian
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
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