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Rent Seeking Can Promote The Provision Of Public Goods

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  • Tyler Cowen
  • Amihai Glazer
  • Henry McMillan

Abstract

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda‐setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost‐benefit analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Tyler Cowen & Amihai Glazer & Henry McMillan, 1994. "Rent Seeking Can Promote The Provision Of Public Goods," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 131-145, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:131-145
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00092.x
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    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1994.tb00092.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Sutter, 1997. "Enforcing Constitutional Constraints," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 139-150, June.
    2. Peter Jaworski, 2014. "An Absurd Tax on our Fellow Citizens: The Ethics of Rent Seeking in the Market Failures (or Self-Regulation) Approach," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 121(3), pages 467-476, May.
    3. Xiaowei Zang, 2010. "Why Are the Elite in China Motivated to Promote Growth?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2010-084, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2014. "The Two-Way Relationship Between Government Spending And Corruption And Its Effects On Economic Growth," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 403-419, April.
    5. del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Governance, social infrastructure and productivity," MPRA Paper 86245, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2018.
    6. Lotta Moberg, 2018. "Liberalizing Rent-Seeking: How Export Processing Zones Can Save or Sink an Economy," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 33(Winter 20), pages 61-89.

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