The Impact Of Political Contributions By Food Manufacturing Firms On U.S. Farm Policy
This study generates an econometric model of the allocation of political contributions by food firms. It combines information about food firms' total expenditures for political influence with the behavioral assumption of profit maximization to test the hypothesis that food manufacturing firms do not lobby against farm policies. The results support the hypothesis. The inferences are conditional on the effects observed in the sample. The conclusions from this analysis may not be widely generalizable, but they do inform hypotheses about the intentions of food firms that participate in the political market.
Volume (Year): 17 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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