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Globalization and domestic conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.
  • Skaperdas, Stergios
  • Syropoulos, Constantinos

Abstract

When a resource like oil is domestically contested, trade patters and welfare can be very different than when property rights are costlessly enforced. Whereas (small-country) importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously relative to autarky, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in world markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource compared to the absence of conflict. For a wide range of prices, higher international prices of the contested resource reduce welfare, an instance of the "natural resource curse."

Suggested Citation

  • Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2008. "Globalization and domestic conflict," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 296-308, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:76:y:2008:i:2:p:296-308
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade openness Property rights Enforcement Insecurity Civil wars;

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General

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