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Globalization and domestic conflict

Listed author(s):
  • Garfinkel, Michelle R.
  • Skaperdas, Stergios
  • Syropoulos, Constantinos

When a resource like oil is domestically contested, trade patters and welfare can be very different than when property rights are costlessly enforced. Whereas (small-country) importers of the contested resource gain unambiguously relative to autarky, exporters of the contested resource lose under free trade, unless the world price of the resource is sufficiently high. Regardless of what price obtains in world markets, countries tend to over-export the contested resource compared to the absence of conflict. For a wide range of prices, higher international prices of the contested resource reduce welfare, an instance of the "natural resource curse."

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 76 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 296-308

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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:76:y:2008:i:2:p:296-308
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552

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