IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens

Listed author(s):
  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    ()

    (Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord (CEPN))

There is a vast literature and several surveys on the economic and political resource curse. However, the surveys often fail to capture two points: 1) they disregard the relationship between this recent literature and the staple theory and the staple trap; 2) the appropriability issue has only been treated tangentially and has never been the focus of any survey. The present work fills these gaps. This paper shows that the political resource curse approach initially focused on the appropriability issue through the lens of ‘looting’ behavior of rebels and distinguished ‘lootable’ and ‘unlootable’ goods. However, lootability casts light on mobility of resources or resistance to appropriation rather than state appropriability. Borrowing upon Baldwin’s distinction between ‘point-source’ and ‘diffuse’ resources, the resource curse literature has recently suggested that state appropriability is related to pointy-resources. The resource curse/blessing assumes that the technical dimension of appropriability and mobility (geographical or purely physical qualities) plays primary role whereas institutional dimensions are either absent or play a secondary role. An alternative approach gives pride of place to the institutional dimension: the same agricultural product such as cereals or coffee can be appropriable or not depending on the institutional structure. Finally, while the literature suffers from a confusion between mobility and appropriability, its relevance in enhancing an appropriative perspective of the state will be underlined.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://cepn.univ-paris13.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/DT-CEPN-2017-14.pdf
Download Restriction: no

File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01583559/document
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord in its series CEPN Working Papers with number 2017-14.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2017
Handle: RePEc:upn:wpaper:2017-14
Contact details of provider: Postal:
99, avenue Jean-Baptiste Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse

Phone: 33 (0)1 49 40 33 18
Fax: 01 49 40 33 34
Web page: https://cepn.univ-paris13.fr/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Macartan Humphreys, 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(4), pages 508-537, August.
  2. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, 2013. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 22(4), pages 570-615, August.
  3. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "Trading with Bandits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 303-321.
  4. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, 01.
  5. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1218-1244, September.
  6. Jonathan Isham & Michael Woolcock & Lant Pritchett & Gwen Busby, 2005. "The Varieties of Resource Experience: Natural Resource Export Structures and the Political Economy of Economic Growth," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 141-174.
  7. Nathan Nunn & Nancy Qian, 2011. "The Potato's Contribution to Population and Urbanization: Evidence From A Historical Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(2), pages 593-650.
  8. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
  9. David Wiens, 2014. "Natural resources and institutional development," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(2), pages 197-221, April.
  10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:01:p:75-90_00 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Auty, Richard M., 2001. "The political economy of resource-driven growth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 839-846, May.
  12. Torvik, Ragnar, 2001. "Learning by doing and the Dutch disease," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 285-306, February.
  13. Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-92-3 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Papaioannou, Elias & Siourounis, Gregorios, 2008. "Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 365-387, September.
  16. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
  17. Hodler, Roland, 2006. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(6), pages 1367-1386, August.
  18. Silje Aslaksen, 2010. "Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(4), pages 421-431, July.
  19. Samuel Bazzi & Christopher Blattman, 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 1-38, October.
  20. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1992. "Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage, and economic growth," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 317-334, December.
  21. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "State Building by Bargaining for Monopoly Rents," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 265-291.
  22. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
  23. C.B. Schedvin, 1990. "Staples and regions of Pax Britannica," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 43(4), pages 533-559, November.
  24. Nugent, Jeffrey B. & Robinson, James A., 2010. "Are factor endowments fate?," Revista de Historia Económica, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(01), pages 45-82, March.
  25. Ramsay, Kristopher W., 2011. "Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(03), pages 507-529, July.
  26. Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, 2003. "Natural Resources and Violent Conflict : Options and Actions," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15047, April.
  27. Eoin McGuirk, 2013. "The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 285-313, March.
  28. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2009. "The Curse of Natural Resources," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 139-156, September.
  29. Kevin Morrison, 2007. "Natural resources, aid, and democratization: A best-case scenario," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 365-386, June.
  30. Acemoglu, Daron, 1995. "Reward structures and the allocation of talent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, January.
  31. Anne D. Boschini & Jan Pettersson & Jesper Roine, 2007. "Resource Curse or Not: A Question of Appropriability," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(3), pages 593-617, 09.
  32. Baland, Jean-Marie & Francois, Patrick, 2000. "Rent-seeking and resource booms," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 527-542, April.
  33. Richard M. Auty, 1997. "Natural Resource Endowment, The State And Development Strategy," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 651-663.
  34. Jason Sorens, 2011. "Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion: The role of rebel constituencies," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(5), pages 571-585, September.
  35. Katharina Wick & Erwin Bulte, 2006. "Contesting resources – rent seeking, conflict and the natural resource curse," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 457-476, September.
  36. Douglass C. North, 1955. "Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 243-243.
  37. Torvik, Ragnar, 2002. "Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 455-470, April.
  38. repec:hrv:faseco:33077825 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-573, October.
  40. Lane, Philip R & Tornell, Aaron, 1996. "Power, Growth, and the Voracity Effect," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 213-241, June.
  41. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
  42. Michael L. Ross, 2004. "What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 337-356, May.
  43. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
  44. North, Douglass C., 1956. "International Capital Flows and the Development of the American West," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(04), pages 493-505, December.
  45. Atkinson, Giles & Hamilton, Kirk, 2003. "Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 1793-1807, November.
  46. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
  47. Matthias Busse & Steffen Gröning, 2013. "The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(1), pages 1-20, January.
  48. Deacon, Robert T., 2011. "The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 7(2), pages 111-208, December.
  49. Cramer, C., 2002. "Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 1845-1864, November.
  50. Leonard Wantchekon, 2002. "Why do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?," Journal of African Development, African Finance and Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 145-176.
  51. Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:upn:wpaper:2017-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pascal Seppecher)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.