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The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability

  • Eoin McGuirk

    ()

This paper proposes and tests a mechanism through which natural resources can affect democracy. I posit that, in the presence of high natural resource rents, leaders lower the burden of taxation on citizens in order to reduce the demand for democratic accountability. The theory is corroborated using micro-level data from public opinion surveys across 15 sub-Saharan countries, in addition to country-level data on natural resource rents. Results are robust to a range of alternative specifications. A supplementary analysis reveals that, consistent with the two-period model proposed, the effects are more acute closer to national elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-011-9820-0
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 154 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 285-313

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:154:y:2013:i:3:p:285-313
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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