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The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries

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  • Roland Hodler

Abstract

This paper develops a model that can explain why natural resources are a curse for some countries, but not for others. In this model, natural resources cause fighting activities between rivalling groups. Fighting reduces productive activities and weakens property rights, making productive activities even less attractive. The aggregate production decrease exceeds the natural resources' direct positive income effect if and only if the number of rivalling groups is sufficiently large. The model thus predicts that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries, but increase incomes in homogenous countries. Empirical evidence that supports this hypothesis is provided

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Hodler, 2004. "The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries," Diskussionsschriften dp0404, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  • Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural resources; Fractionalization; Rent seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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