Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium
A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern.
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- Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
- J. Bhagwati & T. N. Srinivasan, 1979.
"Revenue-Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs,"
243, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-87, December.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1996.
"Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking,"
1996_11, York University, Department of Economics.
- Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
- Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440 Elsevier.
- Prescott, Edward C & Boyd, John H, 1987. "Dynamic Coalitions: Engines of Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 63-67, May.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-75, September.
- Appelbaum, Elie & Katz, Eliakim, 1987. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 685-99, September.
- Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
- Roe, Terry L. & Yeldan, A. Erinc, 1988. "An Open Economy Model of Political Influence and Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups," Bulletins 7499, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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