Existence of Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy
This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents' political activity. To a small open economy the authors graft a government price-setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests. The proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game, establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the economy. Agents' choice sets are found to be nonconvex, a difficulty that the authors resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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