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Governance, social infrastructure and productivity

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  • del Río, Fernando

Abstract

I develop a neoclassical growth model in which the government accumulates contestable social infrastructure. In this framework, both a more accountable and more fairness governance encourages governmental accumulation of social infrastructure which fosters productivity. According to the calibrated model, for a country in the lower decile of the distribution of the index of social infrastructure, improving governance fairness by one standard deviation increases, on average, social infrastructure by 84% and GDP per worker by around 38%. However, the quantitative impact of improving governance accountability on social infrastructure and productivity is negligible.

Suggested Citation

  • del Río, Fernando, 2018. "Governance, social infrastructure and productivity," MPRA Paper 86245, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Apr 2018.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:86245
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; productivity; rent-seeking; social infrastructure.;

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • O47 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence

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